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In a recent report to the U.S. Congress, the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) reported that during theperiod July-December 2001, Chinese entities contin-
ued to supply nuclear and missile materials to Pakistan.
According to the report, Chinese entities have been the
principal suppliers for Pakistan’s serial production of solid-
propellant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) such as
the Shaheen-1 and Haider-1. Moreover, the report con-
tends that successful development of the Shaheen-2 me-
dium range ballistic missile (MRBM) will also require
continued Chinese assistance. The report also suggests
that China has continued to interpret its nonprolifera-
tion commitments narrowly with regard to supplying
nuclear and missile-related materials to its key allies in
the developing world, especially Pakistan.2  Although the
report does not accuse the Chinese government of direct
involvement in the transfers, a strong argument can be
made that in a political system such as that of China, such
sensitive transfers cannot take place on a sustained basis
without the prior knowledge of the central government.
This Chinese behavior has special significance because
China has joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has accepted many prin-
ciples of the international nuclear and missile nonprolif-
eration regimes.
Over the years, largely in response to U.S. economic
and technological sanctions or the threat of such sanc-
tions, China has made several unilateral and bilateral com-
mitments that it would abide by the provisions of these
regimes. Most recently, in October 2002 China issued a
set of comprehensive new export control regulations cov-
ering missile technology, chemical weapons precursors and
technology, and biological agents. These regulations were
issued just prior to the visit of Chinese President Jiang
Zemin to the United States.3  Despite these assurances,
China has remained both a cause of, and a contributor to,
nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia. Since the
late 1990s, evidence suggests that China has limited some
such transfers, but it has found loopholes in the regimes
that it has joined that have enabled it to continue its pro-
liferation links with Pakistan, especially in the missile
technology area. What motivates China in this issue area?
This article argues that Beijing’s motivations in trans-
ferring nuclear and missile materials and technology to
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Pakistan derive largely from Chinese concerns about the
regional balance of power and are part of a Chinese effort
to pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry
with India. Although bureaucratic politics and commer-
cial interests may have some influence on Chinese policy,
in a centralized political system like China, they cannot
plausibly account for the consistent pattern of nuclear and
missile supplies to Pakistan.
A more convincing explanation is that China wants
to limit India’s power capabilities to South Asia and
thereby constrain New Delhi’s aspirations to become a
major power in Asia. India’s emergence as a peer-com-
petitor in Asia would upset China’s predominant position
in the region. However, if acute conflict and an intense
arms race between India and Pakistan persist, India would
continue to be bracketed with its smaller regional rival
Pakistan and not with China. The continuing contradic-
tions in Chinese nonproliferation policy are caused by the
tension that exists between China’s regional interests in
South Asia and its global power aspirations.
As China emerges as a stakeholder great power, its
nonproliferation policy has become more attuned to
maintaining its status, which means supporting outwardly
the norms prohibiting nuclear acquisition by new states.
Yet, regional and global balance of power considerations
simultaneously pull on Chinese policy in this regard, as
evident in persistent Chinese support for the Pakistani
nuclear and missile programs. In the future, China may
limit these supplies to Pakistan in order to prevent the
emergence of a U.S.-Indian military alliance. However, if
the relationship between the United States and India
evolves into a military alliance aimed against China, it is
equally likely that China will court Pakistan more in-
tensely. Balance of power considerations will again be the
key source of such possible policy changes.
The evolution of China’s nonproliferation policy has
coincided with the change in China’s status in the inter-
national system from a challenger to a quasi-status quo
great power actor. Contemporary China has accepted
many norms of international governance as its status as a
great power has been acknowledged by other major pow-
ers, especially the United States. The progression in Chi-
nese policy reflects its acceptance of some of the elements
of the international order that gives legitimacy to China’s
status as a great power and as a preponderant power in
Asia. Sinologists have noticed the gradual progression of
China in the 1980s as both a “system-maintaining” and
“system-exploiting” great power as it began to ask “more
and more what international organizations could do for
China, and less and less what China itself could do to re-
form or transform the existing world order.…”  The
change in China’s position on international organizations
coincided with “the dramatic rise of China’s international
standing in the hegemonic world order and its sui generis
status as a ‘poor global power’ can be explained by the
change in China’s national role conception from a revo-
lutionary system-transforming actor to a neo-realist sys-
tem-maintaining status quo actor.”4   In the
nonproliferation area, some such behavioral changes have
been the result of U.S. pressures. However, the tension
between China’s role as a great power that needs to sup-
port those norms that favor great power dominance of the
international system and China’s regional interest in bal-
ancing a rising power, India, explains the current contra-
dictions in Chinese nonproliferation policy in South Asia.
CHINA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN SOUTH ASIA
China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, especially
with respect to South Asia, contains several elements.
First, China is both a cause of, and a contributor to, nuclear
and missile proliferation in the region. Yet, China appears
to give the impression that as a nuclear weapon state and
permanent member of the UN Security Council (P-5),
China has a responsibility to limit proliferation in South
Asia.
Second, Beijing uses nonproliferation objectives to
maximize its national interests, which include retaining
China as the sole and predominant recognized nuclear
weapon state in Asia, especially in East Asia. For that rea-
son, China is reluctant to see any other states in East Asia
acquiring nuclear arms. In this regard, China seems to
make a distinction between strategically vital regions and
less vital regions. South Asia and the Middle East are less
vital to China than is East Asia. China has been uncom-
fortable with North Korean nuclear aspirations, and
Beijing shares the desire of the United States and Japan
that the Korean peninsula remain non-nuclear. In particu-
lar, China does not want Japan to exploit North Korean
nuclearization as a pretext to acquire nuclear weapons or
adopt a policy of large-scale militarization.5  But China is
unwilling to impose economic sanctions on North Korea,
which could trigger a flood of refugees onto its territory.
China also seems reluctant to abandon the sovereignty
principle and coerce North Korea. China would, however,
provide nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan if that
meant its regional rival India could be balanced and con-
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tained, although China would formally recognize neither
India nor Pakistan as nuclear powers.
Third, over time China has come to see nonprolif-
eration as an avenue to confirm its great power status and
gain recognition from other great powers, especially the
United States. This explains China’s 1992 accession to
the NPT, its 1996 signature of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT)), 1997 ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) (April 1997); its joining
the Zangger Committee in October 1997, Primier Li Peng’s
issuance of nuclear export control regulations in Septem-
ber 1997, assurances to the United States in November
2000 not to help develop ballistic missiles that can be used
to deliver nuclear weapons, and the October 2002 com-
prehensive export control regulations—covering missile
technology (which nearly matched the MTCR regula-
tions), chemical weapons precursors and technology, and
biological agents. These steps gave China greater legiti-
macy as a nuclear weapon state and as a major power. The
United States and its allies have rewarded these actions
with increased trade and access to advanced Western tech-
nology, which have helped China to strengthen its mili-
tary and economic capabilities. Over the years, China
seemed to have changed its supply patterns from fully de-
veloped missiles to missile components and scaled back
some such supplies to Middle Eastern states. However, join-
ing the nonproliferation regime and other cooperative
regional or global institutions does not automatically mean
China complies fully with the norms and principles of
these regimes and institutions.6
China’s accession to the nonproliferation regime oc-
curred as a result of its realization that the regime does
not sharply constrain China’s sovereignty as a major power.
China has been an ardent supporter of the Westphalian
sovereignty norm, which enshrines the internal and ex-
ternal autonomy of a state and prescribes non-interfer-
ence by other states. This conception of sovereignty has
been described as a “normative obstacle to agreement on
limits on weapons proliferation, since it is the sovereign
right of a major power to make money and influence
people, as the U.S. example amply demonstrates.”7   China,
however, seems to make a distinction between the sover-
eignty of powerful states and that of less powerful states,
despite its rhetorical support for the juridical concept of
sovereign equality of all nations. Thus, in spite of its for-
mal and often eloquent support for the equality of nations,
“China uses the concept of equality as a way to protect its
territory and sovereignty. Apart from a declaratory policy
of equality based on the five principles, there is little evi-
dence to suggest that China cares too much whether the
world is organized according to some universal hierarchi-
cal order as long as its own order in the immediate neigh-
borhood is maintained. Apparently, the Chinese
government makes more noises than takes concrete ac-
tions to right the inequality that exists in the world.”8
Becoming a full-fledged global power in the 21st cen-
tury remains a core national objective of China. Chinese
policymakers justify their goal of global power status as
necessary to “prevent the historical humiliations suffered
at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism.”9  In-
terestingly, Chinese writings on major power relations in
Asia rarely mention India as a rising power of much sig-
nificance. For instance, Xue Mouhong, a former ambassa-
dor and vice president of the Society of Asian-African
Studies, argues that the international system is led by one
superpower (the United States) and four other powers:
the European Union (EU), Japan, Russia, and China.
Within Asia, Mouhong views the triangle of relationships
involving the Unitd States, Japan, and China is the de-
ciding factor for peace and stability.10
Fourth, Beijing applies nonproliferation norms selec-
tively in order to strengthen China’s exports of nuclear
materials and, thereby, improve China’s own nuclear and
missile industries. The supply of nuclear and missile tech-
nology to countries in regions where China would have
very little influence otherwise is part of this policy pos-
ture. China has especially been keen to use nuclear and
missile supply as leverage against the United States, par-
ticularly in the Middle East. The expectation in Beijing
seems to be that the supply of these materials to Middle
Eastern countries will increase Chinese influence and re-
duce the effectiveness of U.S. policies in the region.
China’s reluctance to fully join the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), despite promises to abide by
its principles in 1992, has been partially driven by the im-
plications of MTCR membership for commercial dealings
with states such as Iran and Pakistan. Since the late 1990s,
there have been indications that China has considerably
reduced nuclear and missile transfers to the Middle East
and that China has ceased exporting complete missiles to
the region. Instead, China now exports missile compo-
nents and dual use technology. However, the increasing
Chinese dependence on Middle Eastern oil has been an
additional factor in China not fully abandoning its mis-
sile relationship with the states in the region. In October
2002, China issued comprehensive export control regu-
lations which are somewhat similar to MTCR guidelines.
These regulations could further constrain Chinese prolif-
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eration behavior in the Middle East in the future. How-
ever, it is too early to predict how tightly China will imple-
ment these regulations.11
South Asia is the region where Chinese policy shows
its highest level of contradictions. China’s involvement
in nuclear proliferation in South Asia is long-standing.
As a military ally of Pakistan and an adversary of India,
China has helped Islamabad to build its nuclear and mis-
sile capabilities. China has used this assistance to Paki-
stan as a way to balance India militarily and politically.
By helping to continue the India-Pakistan rivalry, China
has also sought to keep India limited to regional power
status and prevent its recognition as a major power. Bal-
ance of power and containment considerations are be-
hind these Chinese calculations. The rise of a new great
power in Asia with nuclear weapons would adversely af-
fect China’s preeminent status on the Asian continent.
India is the only Asian state (with the possible ex-
ception of Japan) which has the potential, and the incli-
nation, to balance China and challenge its status as the
“Asia-Pacific’s sole ‘Middle Kingdom.” In this view, the
possible rise of India as a challenger can be prevented
through the deliberate propping up of the regimes sur-
rounding India—especially Pakistan—and the pursuit of
policies that would reinforce the perception that India is
“weak, indecisive and on the verge of collapse.” The main
plank of this strategy has been military support for states
neighboring India. Chinese arms transfer data show that
the overwhelming majority of Chinese arms sales go to
the states bordering India.12  China has argued that its al-
liance with Pakistan has been in response to what it views
as “Indian imperial tendencies to annex and develop ter-
ritory, which Beijing deems too close to its own borders.”13
Therefore, China has offered the most strident opposi-
tion among all major powers on the question of offering
even de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon
state.
According to Robert Ross, China continues its sup-
port for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile tech-
nology because “China views a credible Pakistani deterrent
as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its
sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power.” China
views its relationship with Pakistan as somewhat similar
to the U.S. relationship with Israel.14  To John Garver,
China wants to keep Pakistan independent, powerful, and
confident in order to present India with a standing two
front threat. If India subordinates Pakistan, its position
against China would become much stronger, reducing
China’s power in South Asia.15   The Chinese calculation
appears to be that while India is preoccupied with Paki-
stan, New Delhi may not be able to develop long-range
military capabilities, especially missiles and naval systems,
to match those of China. This is a short-run calculation,
however, as Chinese assistance to Pakistan seems to be
having a galvanizing effect on India’s determination to
develop capabilities that can match those of China. Over
the longer term, Chinese polices in South Asia may well
work against China’s own interest by making India mili-
tarily and economically stronger, while also encouraging
New Delhi to forge a balancing coalition with the United
States.
Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation began in the
1970s during the tenure of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. This cooperation reached its peak in the 1980s
and early 1990s when Beijing assisted Pakistan in build-
ing its nuclear capabilities. The precise nature of Sino-
Pakistani nuclear cooperation is not fully known, but U.S.
intelligence sources have long contended that the Paki-
stani nuclear bomb project would not have come to frui-
tion without the active support of China. Chinese support
reportedly included a secret blueprint for a nuclear bomb
in the early 1980s, highly enriched uranium, tritium, sci-
entists, and key components for a nuclear weapons pro-
duction complex. Critical Chinese-supplied components
included 500 ring magnets useful in gas centrifuges that
can make weapons-grade enriched uranium (1994-95);
tritium used to boost the yield of atomic weapons (1986);
heavy water needed to operate a plutonium production
reactor, a special industrial furnace to melt plutonium or
weapons-grade uranium into the shape of a nuclear bomb
core (1996); high tech diagnostic equipment (1996); a
nuclear weapon design (1983); and  weapons-grade ura-
nium for the production of one or more nuclear weapons
(since 1983).  More significantly China has provided di-
rect assistance in the building of the unsafeguarded
Khushab reactor, from which Pakistan is known to draw
plutonium for weapons production. China has also been
the major supplier of the IAEA safeguarded Chasma re-
actor and plutonium reprocessing facility and the PARR-
2 research reactor at Rawalpindi.16
A report in the New York Times in 1998 presented
the Chinese support to Pakistan vividly:  “Beginning in
1990, Pakistan is believed to have built between 7 and 12
nuclear warheads—based on Chinese designs, assisted by
Chinese scientists and Chinese technology. That technol-
ogy included Chinese magnets for producing weapons
grade enriched uranium, a furnace for shaping the ura-
nium into a nuclear bomb core, and high-tech diagnostic
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equipment for nuclear weapons tests.”17  The relationship
between the two countries “forced the U.S. to impose
sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani companies sev-
eral times—most recently in 1993 and 1996. However,
former CIA officials now claim that to prevent a U.S.-
China bust-up, the Clinton administration avoided
heavier sanctions, especially after China supplied 34 M-
11 SRBMs to Pakistan in 1992.”18  According to a 1997
Time report, the CIA has concluded that China helped
Pakistan  establish a factory to manufacture M-11 SRBMs
near Rawalpindi in addition to supplying 30 ready-to-
launch M-11s that are stored at the Sargodha Air base
near Lahore. These missiles—delivering a payload of 1,100
pounds (500kg) to a range of 185 miles (300km)—could
be ideal for Pakistani nuclear weapons, and can be tar-
geted on Indian cities near the Pakistani border. 19
The Clinton administration generally ignored intel-
ligence reports about Chinese missile transfers to Paki-
stan or, after threatening limited sanctions, often backed
down after considering the larger policy interest of con-
tinued engagement with China.20  Even after Pakistan’s
nuclear tests in 1998, China is reported to have contin-
ued its assistance to Pakistan by helping to establish the
unsafeguarded 50 MW Khushab reactor, which will pro-
duce weapons grade plutonium, “although such a help is
in direct violation of Article III of the NPT.”21
 Some evidence suggests that China may have lim-
ited direct nuclear transfers to Pakistan since the late
1990s. But the most likely explanation for this shift is not
that China has accepted nonproliferation norms, but
rather that Pakistan no longer needs much assistance, as
it has already acquired an operational nuclear force, thanks
principally to previous transfers from China. Current trans-
fers seem to be confined to dual-use items in the missile
technology area, which gives China the possibility of
claiming that it is not directly violating its regime com-
mitments.22
Sino-Pakistani collaboration was evident in the visit
to China by a Pakistani delegation immediately after the
May 1998 Indian nuclear tests. The delegation hoped to
gain Chinese nuclear guarantees and politico-military
backing. Although the precise outcome of the meeting
was not clear, it is believed that China was not opposed to
Pakistan conducting nuclear tests in response to the In-
dian tests. No open security guarantees were forthcoming
from Beijing, and Pakistan subsequently conducted its own
nuclear tests, claiming that it needed an autonomous
nuclear capability to deter India.
Chinese missile assistance to Pakistan has persisted
for more than a decade and seems to continue steadfastly
even today. This support reportedly includes the M-11
SRBMs noted above, missile components, specialty steels,
guidance systems, and technical expertise. Evidence also
suggests that Chinese and North Korean assistance were
involved in Pakistan’s acquisition of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-
2 SRBMs and the Shaheen MRBM.23   Since 1998, Paki-
stan reportedly received China’s support in the serial
production of the Shaheen-1 SRBM and the Shahen-2
MRBM, including 12 shipments of missile components
and the building of a second missile plant.24  These sup-
plies seem to be occurring even as Pakistan and India have
been engaging in nuclear saber-rattling. China has con-
tinued these activities despite the conclusion of many ana-
lysts that the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia has
increased since 1998. Even considering signs during 2003
of a thaw in India-Pakistan relations, the possibility of a
nuclear crisis erupting still exists.
The China-Pakistan nuclear and missile relationship
assumes new importance in the light of revelations of a
missile-nuclear barter deal between Pakistan and North
Korea. Reports appeared in October 2002 suggesting that
Pakistan had been transferring nuclear materials and tech-
nology for uranium enrichment to North Korea since
1997. In return, Pyongyang has supplied Pakistan with
Nodong MRBMs. Pakistan offers North Korea the best
possible source for nuclear technology, given Islamabad’s
need for missiles as delivery systems for its nuclear weap-
ons. The Bush administration has as yet refused to im-
pose sanctions as required by U.S. law because of Pakistan’s
cooperation in the war against Al Qaeda.25  China’s di-
rect role in the North Korea-Pakistan relationship re-
mains unclear, although some speculate that China tacitly
approves these transactions. U.S.-made C-130 transport
aircraft used in the barter deal have made stops at Chi-
nese air bases on their trips between Pakistan and North
Korea. Strong evidence also indicates that the Nodong
MRBM is a copy of the Chinese CSS-2 missile, suggest-
ing that the key source of North Korean missile technol-
ogy was China.26
It is noteworthy that as an ally of both Pakistan and
North Korea, China would be well-placed to restrain their
behavior. Beijing has, however, shown no such leadership
in this regard. This reticence may well be due to fears of
undermining its relationships with both Pakistan and
North Korea. This episode also shows China’s continuing
unwillingness to assume nonproliferation responsibilities
as a P-5 member state and aspiring global power. Despite
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its great power aspirations, China has not yet engaged re-
gional states in a nonproliferation leadership role similar
to that of the United States.
THE INDIAN RESPONSE
The Sino-Pakistani military relationship, especially
its nuclear component, has had an impact on Indian policy.
To New Delhi, the Chinese nuclear and missile transfers
to Pakistan, which continued even after Beijing acceded
to the NPT and pledged to abide by MTCR guidelines,
demonstrate that a nuclear weapon state can blatantly
violate its commitments and get away with it.27  Barring
occasional U.S. protests, the international community—
especially those nations and NGOs that ardently support
the NPT—has remained silent even while stepping up
pressure on India to adhere to the NPT and abandon its
nuclear weapons program. The Indian elite have viewed
the Chinese nuclear/missile relationship with Pakistan as
a deliberate containment strategy by Beijing designed to
deny India a leadership role in the regional and global
order. Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation contributed to
India’s decision to accelerate its nuclear weapon program
and conduct open nuclear tests in May 1998, following a
period of virtual limbo after the 1974 nuclear test. The
1974 test itself was partially the result of Indian concerns
about China’s nuclear program and the U.S.-Chinese alli-
ance with Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh War. Do-
mestic and idiosyncratic factors were important reasons
why the Indian program remained dormant for over a de-
cade. It was only in response to Pakistan accelerating its
nuclear program with the aid of China that Prime Minis-
ter Rajiv Gandhi initiated an Indian weapons program
around 1988.28
The stridently nationalistic BJP government con-
ducted the 1998 nuclear tests shortly after taking office,
arguing that China formed the most powerful long-term
threat to India. Prior to the tests, Indian Defense Minis-
ter, George Fernandes, called China the number one po-
tential threat to India. This statement led to vociferous
denunciations from Beijing and an intense debate in In-
dia, with left-leaning political parties and intellectuals ac-
cusing Fernandes of inventing the China threat.29  These
latter groups cite China’s drifting away from Pakistani for-
eign policy positions on Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Islamic
fundamentalism to counter the BJP-led government’s
claim that China threatens India. Subsequently, Indian
Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in a letter to President
Clinton, justified India’s tests largely because of the 1962
Indo-Chinese War, China’s own nuclear weapons policy,
and Beijing’s support for the Pakistani nuclear weapons
program.
This justification irritated China further and Beijing
responded with strong rhetoric about the need to roll back
the Indian nuclear program. Since then, China has con-
tinued its policy of strident opposition to the open nuclear
tests by India. As a result, diplomatic relations between
the two countries remained somewhat frozen for nearly
two years, although the United States, France, and Russia
have engaged in negotiations with New Delhi, accepting
the Indian nuclear deterrent as a fait accompli.30  Since
2000, China has begun to resurrect its diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties with India, largely motivated by fears of a U.S.-
Indian alignment.
Indian analysts believe that China has been pursuing
a strategy of simultaneous containment of, and engage-
ment with, India.31  The Chinese containment strategy
involves alliance with Pakistan and a gradual military
buildup in the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal region through
establishing military bases in places such as Myanmar. 32
The Chinese policy of containing India through military
buildup has been noted by Western analysts as well. Quot-
ing Chinese sources, Iain Johnston has argued that the
dominant Chinese motivation in arming Pakistan has
been to “help divert Indian military resources away from
China.”33  The Chinese engagement policy has involved
reduction of tensions in the border region, a series of high
profile visits, and periodic proclamations in official and
unofficial statements about the traditional friendship be-
tween the two countries. Since 1988, joint working groups
have been negotiating confidence-building measures and
other means to promote mutual cooperation. However,
the engagement policy received a severe backlash with
the Indian nuclear tests in 1998.
Following the tests, the P-5 foreign ministers met in
Geneva and condemned the tests. The meeting was
chaired by the Chinese foreign minister, even though
China had helped to build the Pakistani nuclear weapons
capability. The resolution adopted at the meeting declared
that “notwithstanding the recent nuclear tests, India and
Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states
in accordance with the NPT.”34  The Chinese position,
according to Jonathan Pollack, is that China, as a perma-
nent member of the UN, views itself as a “stakeholder” in
the existing nuclear order and would “want to keep it to
be a small club.”35
Since the Indian nuclear tests, the United States has
begun serious negotiations with India and Pakistan. Sev-
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eral rounds of these talks have begun to bear fruit—both
India and Pakistan have softened their position on CTBT
and have begun a process of political dialogue. China has
been the most strident opponent of the negotiations and
de facto recognition of India’s nuclear status. According
to Chinese foreign policy officials, even discussing with
India the maintenance of a minimum nuclear deterrent
would violate UN Security Council Resolution 1172. they
maintain that the tests “have severely interrupted the ‘good
momentum’ of global non-proliferation efforts since the
Cold War, and concerted efforts by the major powers are
essential to ‘halt the slide.’” 36  To Chinese officials,
Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton was intended to “drive a wedge
between the U.S. and China” and an attempt by New
Delhi to “align itself with the U.S. as a potential ally
against China and to confront it in the region.”37  How-
ever, since April 1999, China’s relations with India seem
to have been on a mending course. The joint working
groups met in Beijing in April 1999, and Chinese Vice-
Premier Qian Qichen told Indian Foreign Secretary K.
Reghunath that the “world needs to be democratized…
China and India can make important contributions in
giving shape to a multi-polar system.” This meeting was
perhaps the first time that China has mentioned India as
a player in the global system.38   Despite this statement,
however, China still holds to the position that both India
and Pakistan should implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1172, which calls on both countries to dis-
arm.
China has criticized India’s policies in the sub-conti-
nent as “hegemonistic” and has demanded India aban-
don its nuclear program and join the NPT as a non-nuclear
state. It is worth remembering that it was not too long
ago that China criticized the Partial Test Ban Treaty and
the NPT as instruments designed by the superpowers to
maintain their hegemony. India now uses the same justi-
fication as China did earlier. China’s transformation into
a supporter of the NPT occurred in the early 1990s with
the end of the Cold War. Since then, China has also sup-
ported the CTBT and played an important role in intro-
ducing a clause in the CTBT that requires all 44 countries
with at least one nuclear to sign the treaty before it can
enter into force. To India, this clause was a deliberate at-
tempt by China to coerce New Dehli into accepting the
CTBT, even though the clause violated the Vienna Con-
vention on Treaties.39
Partially in response to China’s containment and bal-
ancing strategy, India has stepped up its defense modern-
ization programs with the aim of developing a blue-water
navy during the next decade. The BJP government’s ‘look
East policy’ has been  aimed at enhancing military and
economic cooperation with East Asian and Southeast
Asian countries. In pursuing this policy, India has con-
ducted several joint naval exercises with Vietnam, South
Korea, and Malaysia. In addition, it has stepped up mari-
time cooperation with Japan and the United States.
India’s rapprochement with the United States has also
been partially driven by the China factor. 40  The U.S.-In-
dian relationship has been moving on a steady course, but
was slowed down by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the sub-
sequent U.S. need to gain the support of the Musharraf
regime in Pakistan for its war against Al Qaeda.
During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
to Beijing in June 2003, China pursued the engagement
strand of its strategy.  At the meeting, China and India
agreed to accelerate the process of border settlement, open
up the Nathu La pass in Sikkim for trade with Tibet (with
China thereby implicitly accepting Indian control over
Sikkim), while for its part India agreed to recognize Tibet
as part of Chinese territory. It seems that the possibility of
India sending troops to Iraq in support of the U.S. occu-
pation forces there was a pivotal factor in Beijing’s deci-
sion to make these concessions to New Delhi.41  Chinese
overtures to India like these may be partially aimed at pre-
venting a U.S.-India alliance from emerging. It is too soon
to predict how improving Sino-Indian relations might
impact China’s missile and nuclear relationship with Pa-
kistan, however.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
China’s promotion of nuclear and missile prolifera-
tion in South Asia through its transfer of materials and
technology to Pakistan has major consequences. Through
its continued supply of nuclear and missile materials to
Pakistan, China has become a cause of, and a contributor
to, nuclear proliferation in the region. Although this re-
lationship with Pakistan also offers China some means for
limiting the extent and scope of the nuclear arms race
between India and Pakistan, China has shown little incli-
nation to restrain its regional ally, largely because the Chi-
nese policy towards South Asia is driven by balance of
power and containment considerations. These policies are
part of China’s realpolitk strategic culture, which values
the pursuit of traditional power and prestige as “maximiz-
ing national interests in a competitive and relatively dan-
gerous world.”42  The realpolitik approach also views
international politics as an “intensely competitive struggle
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to acquire relative gains, a struggle in which military and
economic power are crucial determinants.”43
Chinese policies in South Asia have helped to un-
dermine the effectiveness of the NPT and have decreased
the possibilities of India and Pakistan joining the regime
as non-nuclear weapon states. China’s nuclear transfers
to Pakistan violated Beijing’s obligations under the NPT,
as the treaty explicitly prohibits transfer of nuclear weap-
ons materials by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear
weapon states. Nevertheless, the international commu-
nity generally ignores this policy as unavoidable behav-
ior by a great power. This stance has weakened the
legitimacy of the NPT and made the adherence of India
to the treaty virtually impossible. The contradictions in
Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policy seem to have
hurt the nonproliferation regime in both the short and
long run. These contradictions are unlikely to end any-
time soon, given the influence of balance of power con-
sideration on the relationship between China, India, and
Pakistan in South Asia and China and the United States
in East Asia.
Some analysts argue that Chinese actions do not al-
ways reflect the preferences of the Chinese government,
as some bureaucratic actors and firms may be acting inde-
pendently. Thus not all Chinese actions should be regarded
as those of a centralized actor. This explanation is plau-
sible in some rare and isolated instances, but it is very
unlikely that the Chinese government has no knowledge
or control over one of the most sensitive areas of national
policy—nuclear and missile transfers to unstable coun-
tries. Without the knowledge of central authorities, bu-
reaucratic actors or industrial firms cannot continually
violate international regime commitments over an ex-
tended period of time, as has been the case with nuclear
and missile technology transfers to Pakistan.
China has partially changed its policies toward Paki-
stan in response to U.S. pressure and as a result of increas-
ing participation by Beijing in international institutions
and regimes. But as long as the Sino-Indian and Indian-
Pakistani rivalries exist, China is likely to support its South
Asian ally, even though some of this support may in the
long-run accelerate India’s military and economic buildup
and cause New Dehli to focus on military competition
with China. Containment and balancing as strategies are
generally not successful in the long run, however, if the
target has the potential to develop indigenous capabili-
ties and form alignments that can thwart such polices.
Great powers that practice containment and balance of
power strategies often tend to ignore these longer run con-
sequences and costs. Continuing U.S. pressures, the pos-
sibility of a U.S.-Indian alignment, improved Sino-Indian
relations, rapprochement between India and Pakistan, and
finally China’s deeper involvement in international in-
stitutions and regimes could eventually prove to be sources
of change for Chinese policy in South Asia. But regard-
less of how these factors may develop, balance of power
considerations will still remain a dominant source of Chi-
nese proliferation behavior in the region.
1 The author would like to thank William Hogg and Izumi Wakugawa for their
research assistance and the anonymous reviewer and the editor of the journal for
their useful comments.
2 Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisi-
tion of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July through December 2001,” Washington D.C.,
January 2003, pp. 8, 10-11, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/
july_dec2001.htm>.
3 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Stud-
ies, “Chinese Export Controls and Jiang Zemin’s Visit to the United States,” Octo-
ber 21, 2002, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/chiexp/index.htm >
4  Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behavior,” in Thomas
W. Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp. 401-34. On China’s changing atti-
tudes towards nuclear proliferation, see Weixing Hu, “Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion,” in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon (Lanham,
MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 119-140.
5  Eric A. McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” in
James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh eds., China’s Military Faces the Future
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999) pp.273-76.
6 Samuel S. Kim, “China as a Great Power,” Current History 96 (September 1997),
pp. 246-51. As Allen Whiting has argued, “Within this limited framework, how-
ever, there is a potential basis for increased cooperation emerging from association
with a group where values, norms, and institutionalized behavior provide intan-
gible rewards of status or punishment of censure.” Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese
Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect,” in Samuel S. Kim ed., China and the
World, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 297.
7 Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,”
in Kim, ed., China and the World, p. 73.
8  Gerald Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations (Houndsmills, UK:
Macmillan, 1999), p. 78. Although ideology has retained “identity defining di-
mension” of China’s foreign policy behavior, it has become “increasingly trans-
formed into a set of abstract principles and behavioral norms used to criticize the
conduct of other states.”  Steven I. Levine, “Perception and Ideology in Chinese
Foreign Policy,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., Chinese
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.,39.
9  Paul H. Goodwin, “Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First
Century,” in Kim, ed. China and the World, p. 17. China has been fairly successful
in enhancing its major power status immediately following the nuclear tests by
India and Pakistan in May 1998 as evident in the Clinton administration bestow-
ing on it the chairmanship of the P-5 foreign ministers meeting at Geneva in June
1998 to condemn the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.
10  Quoted in Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations, pp. 110-11.
11  On the importance and limitations of these regulations, see, Jing-dong Yuan,
Phillip C. Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi, “Recent Developments in China’s
Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges,” Nonproliferation Re-
view 9 (Fall/Winter 2002), pp. 153-167.
12 J. Mohan Malik, “South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations,” Pacifica Review 13
(February 2001), p. 74. This pattern may also partially reflect the budgetary
constraints of the small South Asian states, which rely on China because they
cannot afford to buy more modern weapons from other suppliers.
9The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003
13  William T. Tow, “China and the International Strategic System,” in Robinson
and Shanbaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 152.
14  Robert S. Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” in Alastair Iain Johnston
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 193.
15  John W. Garver, “China and South Asia,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 519, 1992, pp. 80-83, cited in Malik, South Asia in
China’s Foreign Relations,” p. 85.
16 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance
to Pakistan,” <http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm>, pp. 6-11.
17 Tim Weiner, “U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build the Bomb,” New York
Times, June 1, 1998, p. A6.
18 Ahmed Rashid, “Comrades-in Arms,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25,
1998, p. 13.
19  Douglas Waller, “The Secret Missile Deal,” Time, June 30, 1997.
20  Mel Gurttov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the
Military (Boulder CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998), p. 219.
21  K. Subrhamanyam, “Eight Months after the Nuclear Tests,” Paper Presented
at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, February 16, 1999.
22  Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China’s Missile Exports and Assistance
to Pakistan,” <http://www.nti.org/db/china/mpakpos.htm>.
23 Ibid.
24  Shirly A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Missiles: Policy Issues,” Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Sep-
tember 6, 2002, pp. 5-7.
25  David E. Sanger, “Atomic Ties Link North Korea and Pakistan,” New York
Times, November 25, 2002; Jim Hoagland, “Nuclear Deceit,” Washington Post,
November 10, 2002, p. B07; Gaurav Kampani, “Second Tier Proliferation: The
Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Fall-Winter 2002),
pp. 107-115.
26 Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett, “N. Korea, Pakistan, China,”
Washington Times, December 8, 2002, <www.washingtontimes.com>. Some
analysts, however, argue that Russia has also been a source of assistance for the
North Korean missile program. See, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “North
Korea Profile: Missile Chronology, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/
Missile/65.html>.
27  Article I of the NPT explicitly prohibits such transfers. It states: “Each nuclear
weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to
assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or control
over such weapons or explosive devices.” Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Appendix IV, in William Epstein, The Last Chance (New York: The
Free Press, 1976), p. 317.
28 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999) Chapters 10-11.
29 On the debate that Fernandes’ statement caused, see India Today Interna-
tional, May 18, 1998, pp. 10-13.
30 C. Raja Mohan, “Ending the Sino-Indian Drift,” The Hindu, January 27, 1999,
p. 14.
31 Indian strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam has argued that the Chinese threat
to India is indirect. China’s emergence as a superpower is bound to affect India’s
security.  “If China can transfer nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan and
thereby countervail India, there is no need for China to pose a threat to India.
China can continue to be friendly with India but at the same time lock India in
a nuclear standoff with Pakistan. It can also treat both Pakistan and India in the
same category as regional powers, not in the same class as China, which is a global
player.” K. Subrahmanyam, “Understanding China: Sun Tzu and Shakti,” Times
of India, June 5, 1998, p. 7.
32 “China has developed a commercial and military presence in Myanmar (Burma)
through Hunnan and also has a military presence in the Coco and Hyunghai
Islands, which give China a military platform in the Bay of Bengal. China has
established a long-range, low frequency facility in the Coco Islands,” to use for
submarine activities and also to monitor Indian missile tests. “Ashok Kapur, “China
and Proliferation: Implications for India,” China Report 34 (1998), pp. 401-17.
33 Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Kim ed.,
China and the World, p. 63.
34 Associated Press, June 4, 1998. See also Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, India
the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002), ch. 6.
35  Quoted in Rone Tempest, “Dangerous Dynamic Between China and India,”
Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1998.
36 “China Opposes Minimum N-deterrence for India,” The Hindu, January 28,
1999, p. 14.
37 Aziz Haniffa, “China Prevents P-5 from Softening Stand on N-tests,” India
Abroad, January 1, 1999,  p. 9.
38 Times of India, April 28, 1999, p. 1. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and
Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran visited Beijing in June 1999 and February
2000 increasing the tempo of interactions between the two countries. In 2003,
both the Indian Defense Minister Fernandes and Prime Minister Vajpayee visited
Beijing.
39 Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs, 77 (September-
October 1998), p. 46.
40 Malik, “South Asia in Chinese Foreign Relations,” p. 80.
41  Jyothi Malhotra, “For India’s Tibet Turn, China to Amend its Sikkim Map,”
Indian Express, June 25, 2003.
42 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-
1992: A First Cut at the Data,” China Quarterly 153 (March 1998), pp. 2-3.
43  Alastair Iain Johnston, “Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization:
Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control,” China Quarterly 126 (June
1996), p. 549.
